An asymmetric cryptographic system using mathematically related key pairs — a public key for encryption or signature verification and a private key for decryption or signing — enabling secure communication, digital signatures, and authentication without requiring shared secrets. In blockchain systems it underpins wallet addresses, transaction signing, and identity verification.
Semantic Classification
Content
Class Declaration
Declaration(Class(:Public-KeyCryptography))
Subclass Relationships
SubClassOf(:Public-KeyCryptography :CryptographicPrimitive) SubClassOf(:Public-KeyCryptography :BlockchainEntity)
Essential Properties
SubClassOf(:Public-KeyCryptography (ObjectSomeValuesFrom :partOf :Blockchain))
SubClassOf(:Public-KeyCryptography (ObjectSomeValuesFrom :hasProperty :Property))
Data Properties
DataPropertyAssertion(:hasIdentifier :Public-KeyCryptography “BC-0031”^^xsd:string) DataPropertyAssertion(:hasAuthorityScore :Public-KeyCryptography “1.0”^^xsd:decimal) DataPropertyAssertion(:isFoundational :Public-KeyCryptography “true”^^xsd:boolean)
Object Properties
ObjectPropertyAssertion(:enablesFeature :Public-KeyCryptography :BlockchainFeature) ObjectPropertyAssertion(:relatesTo :Public-KeyCryptography :RelatedConcept)
Annotations
AnnotationAssertion(rdfs:label :Public-KeyCryptography “Public-Key Cryptography”@en) AnnotationAssertion(rdfs:comment :Public-KeyCryptography “Asymmetric encryption system”@en) AnnotationAssertion(dct:description :Public-KeyCryptography “Foundational blockchain concept with formal ontological definition”@en) AnnotationAssertion(:termID :Public-KeyCryptography “BC-0031”) AnnotationAssertion(:priority :Public-KeyCryptography “1”^^xsd:integer) AnnotationAssertion(:category :Public-KeyCryptography “cryptographic-foundations”@en) )
About Public-Key Cryptography
- Asymmetric encryption system within blockchain systems, providing essential functionality for distributed ledger technology operations and properties.
Key Characteristics
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- Definitional Property: Core defining characteristic
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- Functional Property: Operational behavior
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- Structural Property: Compositional elements
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- Security Property: Security guarantees provided
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- Performance Property: Efficiency considerations
Technical Components
- Implementation: How concept is realized technically
- Verification: Methods for validating correctness
- Interaction: Relationships with other components
- Constraints: Technical limitations and requirements
Use Cases
- 1. Core Blockchain Operation
- Application: Fundamental blockchain functionality
- Example: Practical implementation in major blockchains
- Requirements: Technical prerequisites
- Benefits: Value provided to blockchain systems
Standards & References
- IEC 23257:2021 - Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies
- IEEE 2418.1 - Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies
- NIST NISTIR - Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies
Current Landscape (2026)
- The field’s centre of gravity has shifted to the post-quantum transition: on 13 August 2024 NIST finalised its first three standards replacing RSA and elliptic-curve schemes — FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, ex-CRYSTALS-Kyber) for key establishment, FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, ex-Dilithium) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, ex-SPHINCS+) for signatures.
- Algorithm diversity was reinforced when NIST selected the code-based HQC as a backup key-encapsulation mechanism on 11 March 2025 (draft FIPS expected 2026, final 2027), while the Falcon-based FN-DSA signature standard (draft FIPS 206) remained unpublished as of mid-2026.
- Hybrid key agreement has reached mainstream production: the X25519MLKEM768 group is enabled by default across Chrome/Edge (since Chrome 131, November 2024), Firefox and recent Apple OSes, and Cloudflare reported on 7 April 2026 that over half of the human traffic it processes now uses post-quantum key agreement.
- Messaging and infrastructure providers moved early — Apple shipped iMessage PQ3 (ML-KEM-768 with ongoing re-keying) from iOS 17.4 in March 2024, Signal deployed PQXDH from late 2023, and OpenSSL 3.5 (April 2025) added native ML-KEM/ML-DSA/SLH-DSA support, bringing PQC to servers built on NGINX, Apache and HAProxy.
- Regulation hardened sharply in 2026: US Executive Order 14412 and OMB memo M-26-15 (both June 2026) set hard deadlines of 31 December 2030 for federal key-establishment migration and 2031 for signatures, with agency plans due around 22 October 2026; the NSA’s CNSA 2.0 requires ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87 in new National Security System acquisitions from 1 January 2027, and the UK NCSC set a 2028/2031/2035 phased timeline.
- NIST IR 8547 sets the retirement calendar for classical public-key cryptography — RSA-2048 and 112-bit elliptic curves deprecated after 2030 and disallowed by 2035 — and CMVP moves FIPS 140-2 modules to Historical on 21 September 2026, forcing federal procurement onto FIPS 140-3.
- The frontier challenge is urgency versus scale: three papers between May 2025 and March 2026 cut the estimated qubit count to break RSA-2048 from roughly 20 million toward under 100,000, pushing Google and Cloudflare to pull full-migration targets forward to 2029, while “harvest-now-decrypt-later” interception, larger PQC keys and signatures (an ML-KEM-768 key is 1,184 bytes versus 32 for X25519), and slow signature/PKI migration remain open problems.
References
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- NIST (2024). NIST Releases First 3 Finalized Post-Quantum Encryption Standards. https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards
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- NIST CSRC (2024–2025). Post-Quantum Cryptography project (FIPS 203/204/205, HQC selection, IR 8547 transition timeline). https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography
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- Cloudflare (2025). The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025. https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-2025/
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- Shattered.io (2026). Post-Quantum Cryptography: 50% of Web Now Safe [2026]. https://shattered.io/post-quantum-cryptography-2026/
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- postquantum.com (2026). US Federal PQC Mandate After June 2026: Complete Guide (EO 14412, OMB M-26-15, CNSA 2.0). https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/us-federal-pqc-mandate-2026/
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- Cloud Security Alliance (2026). Harvest Now, Decrypt Later: Quantum Risk to AI Infrastructure. https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/ai-infrastructure-post-quantum-harvest-now-decrypt-later-v1/