GNSS spoofing is the broadcasting of counterfeit satellite-like signals to deceive a GNSS receiver into producing incorrect position, navigation or timing data.12
A peer-reviewed paper summarises two broad categories. In meaconing, an attacker records a signal at one place and time and replays it elsewhere. In fabrication, signals are generated from recorded ephemeris or almanac data. It also describes simplistic, intermediate and sophisticated attack classes, distinguished by whether a signal simulator is used, whether the spoofer tracks the real signals, and whether several coordinated transmitters are involved. The classification is one account from the literature and the authors treat the most elaborate class as not yet observed.2
This paper states that civilian GNSS signals in general lack signal authentication, and that navigation message authentication, including the Galileo Open Service scheme, has been proposed or introduced as a countermeasure. It also describes a replay attack aimed at authenticated signals, so authentication is presented as one layer of defence rather than a guarantee. Detection methods discussed include monitoring signal power, antenna arrays and correlator outputs, each with stated limits against careful attackers.2
EASA lists possible symptoms of spoofing in aircraft, among them discrepancies in navigation positions, time shifts and spurious terrain-alert warnings. A symptom list is advisory, and its absence does not show that a receiver is unaffected. Spoofing should not be confused with jamming, which denies the signal rather than replacing it.1
Footnotes
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EASA, “Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Outages and Alterations”, page summarising Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02R4. https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/air-operations/global-navigation-satellite-system-outages-and-alterations ↩ ↩2
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Nabi et al., “Using machine learning for the detection of structured interference in Global Navigation Satellite Systems”, PeerJ Computer Science 10:e2399, 2024. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11623110/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3